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What happens if in the Muddy Children story [22] we drop
the assumption that the public announcements (made by the
father and by the children) are commonly known to be al-
ways true, and instead we simply assume that they are true
and commonly believed to be true? More generally, what
happens in the long term with a group’s beliefs, knowledge
and “epistemic states” (fully describable in fact by condi-
tional beliefs), when receiving (or exchanging) a sequence
of public announcements of truthful but uncertain informa-
tion? Do the agents’ beliefs (or knowledge, or conditional
beliefs, or other doxastic attitudes such as “strong beliefs”)
reach a fixed point? Or do they exhibit instead a cyclic be-
havior, oscillating forever?
These questions are of obvious importance for Belief Re-
vision theory, Learning theory and Social Choice theory,
and may have some relevance to Game Theory as well. In
fact, some of these questions came to our attention due to
a recent talk by J. van Benthem (Chennai, January 2009),
in which he was refining his previous “dynamic” analysis
[14] of backward induction solution in perfect information
games. This extended abstract provides some partial an-
swers to some of the questions above, as well as a conve-
nient setting for investigating further the ones that are still
open.
2 Beliefs and Joint Upgrades in Plausibility
Models
In this section, we review some basic notions and results
from [5]. We use finite “plausibility” frames, in the sense of
our papers [5, 7, 6, 8, 10, 9]. These kind of semantic struc-
tures are the natural multi-agent generalizations of struc-
tures that are standard, in one form or another, in Belief
Revision: Halpern’s “preferential models” [24], Spohn’s
ordinal-ranked models [28], Board’s “belief-revision struc-
tures” [18], Grove’s “sphere” models [23]. Unlike the set-
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tings in [10, 9], we restrict here to the finite case, for at
least three reasons. First, since in the finite case all the
above-mentioned semantic approaches are equivalent, this
assumption gives a certain “semantic robustness” to the re-
sults in this paper : they are independent on which of the
above semantic approaches is preferred. Secondly, it seems
realistic to assume that an agent starts with a finite belief
base, consisting of finitely many sentences that are believed
on their own merits (even if, by logical omniscience, the
agent also believes all their infinitely many consequences);
but, since all the languages considered here have the finite
model property, any such finite base can be represented in
a finite plausibility model. Thirdly, our questions in the In-
troduction make sense primarily for finite structures: only
for finite models it is reasonable at all to expect that iter-
ated announcements might reach a fixed point after finitely
many iterations.
For a given set A of labels called “agents”, a (finite, multi-
agent) plausibility frame is a structure S = (S,≥a)a∈A,
consisting of a finite set S of “states”, together with a fam-
ily of locally connected preorders ≥a⊆ S × S, labeled by
agents. Here, a “locally connected preorder” ≥⊆ S × S
is a reflexive and transitive relation such that: if s ≥ t and
s ≥ w then either t ≥ w or w ≥ t; and if t ≥ s and
w ≥ s then either t ≥ w or w ≥ t. See [5] for a justi-
fication and motivation for these conditions.1 We use the
notation s ∼a t for the comparability relation with respect
to ≥a (i.e. s ∼a t iff either s ≥a t or t ≥a s), s >a t
for the corresponding strict order relation (i.e. s >a t iff
s ≥a t but t 6≥a s), and s ∼=a t for the corresponding indif-
ference relation (i.e. s ∼=a t iff both s ≥a t and t ≥a s). In
any plausibility frame, the comparability relations ∼a are
equivalence relations, and so they induce partitions. We
denote by s(a) := {t ∈ S : s ∼a t} the ∼a-partition cell
of s.
(Pointed) Plausibility Models A (finite, multi-agent)
pointed plausibility model (or “model”, for short) is a
structure S = (S,≥a, ‖·‖, s0)a∈A, consisting of a plau-
1In the infinite case, one has to add a well-foundedness condi-
tion, obtaining “locally well-preordered” relations.
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sibility frame (S,≥a)a∈A together with a valuation map
‖·‖ : Φ → P(S), mapping every element p of some given
set Φ of “atomic sentences” into a set of states ‖p‖ ⊆ S,
and together with a designated state s0 ∈ S, called the
“actual state”.
(Common) Knowledge and (Conditional) Belief Given
a plausibility model S, sets P,Q ⊆ S of states, an agent
a ∈ A and some group G ⊆ A, we define: besta P =
Min≥aP := {s ∈ P : s′ ≥a s for all s′ ∈ P},
KaP := {s ∈ S : s(a) ⊆ P}, BaP := {s ∈ S :
bestas(a) ⊆ P}, BQa P := {s ∈ S : besta( s(a) ∩
Q ) ⊆ P}, EkGP :=
⋂









GP := P and
Ekn+1G := EkG(Ek
n
GP ) ), EbP := EbAP , and CkP :=
CkAP .
Interpretation. The elements of S represent the possible
states, or “possible worlds”, of a system: possible descrip-
tions of the real world. The correct description of the real
world is given by the “actual state” s0. The atomic sen-
tences p ∈ Φ represent “ontic” (non-doxastic) facts, that
might hold or not in a given state. The valuation tells us
which facts hold at which worlds. For each agent a, the
equivalence relation ∼a represents the agent a’s epistemic
indistinguishability relation, inducing a’s information par-
tition; s(a) is the state s’s information cell with respect to
a’s partition: if s were the real state, then agent a would
consider all the states t ∈ s(a) as “epistemically possible”.
KaP is the proposition “agent a knows P ”: observe that
this is indeed the same as Aumann’s partition-based defi-
nition of knowledge. The plausibility relation ≥a is agent
a’s plausibility order between her “epistemically possible”
states: we read s ≥a t as “agent a considers t at least
as plausible as s (though the two are epistemically indis-
tinguishable)”. This is meant to capture the agent’s (con-
ditional) beliefs about the state of the system. Note that
s ≥a t implies s ∼a t, so that the agent only compares the
plausibility of states that are epistemically indistinguish-
able: so we are not concerned here with counterfactual be-
liefs (going against the agent’s knowledge), but only with
conditional beliefs (if given new evidence that must be
compatible with prior knowledge). So BQa P is read “agent
a believes P conditional on Q ” and means that, if a would
receive some further (certain) information Q (to be added
to what she already knows) then she would believe that P
was the case. So conditional beliefs BQa give descriptions
of the agent’s plan (or commitments) about what would she
believe (about the current state) if she would learn some
new information Q. To quote J. van Benthem in [13], con-
ditional beliefs are “static pre-encodings” of the agent’s
potential belief changes in the face of new information.
The above definition says thatBQa P holds iff P holds in all
the “best” (i.e. the most plausible) Q-states (that are con-
sistent with a’s knowledge). In particular, a simple (non-
conditional) belief BaP holds iff P holds in all the best
states that are epistemically possible for a.
“Strong Belief” Another important doxastic attitude,
called strong belief, is given by:
SbaP = {s ∈ P : s(a) ∩ P 6= ∅ and w >a t for all t ∈
s(a) ∩ P and all w ∈ s(a) \ P}.
So P is strong belief at a state s iff P is epistemically
possible and moreover all epistemically possible P -states
at s are more plausible than all epistemically possible
non-P states. This notion corresponds to the “strong be-
lief” of Battigalli and Siniscalchi [11], and to the “robust
belief” of Stalnaker [29]. As for belief and knowledge,




Doxastic Propositions As long as the model S is kept
fixed, we can identify (as we did above) a “proposition”
with any set P ⊆ S of states in S. But, since later we
will proceed to study systematic changes of models, we
need a notion of proposition that can be interpreted in any
model. A doxastic proposition is a map P assigning to
each plausibility model S some set PS ⊆ S of states in
S. We write s |=S P, and say that the proposition P
is true at state s ∈ S in the model S, iff s ∈ PS. We
say that a doxastic proposition P is true at (the pointed
model) S, and write S |= P if it is true at the “actual
state” s0 in the model S, i.e. if s0 |=S P. In particular,
we have the “always true” > and “always false” ⊥ propo-
sitions ⊥S := ∅,>S := S. Also, for each atomic sen-
tence p, there exists a corresponding doxastic proposition
p, given by pS = ‖p‖S. All the operations on sets can
be similarly “lifted” pointwise to propositions: negation
(¬P)S := S \PS, conjunction (P∧R)S := PS∩RS etc,
the “best” operator (besta P)S := bestaPS, all the modal-
ities (KaP)S := KaPS, (BaP)S := BaPS, (BQa P)S :=
BQSa PS etc.
Characterization of strong belief It is easy to see that we
have the following equivalence:
S |= SbaP iff:
S |= BaP and S |= BQa P
for every Q such that S |= ¬Ka(Q → ¬P).
In other words: something is strong belief iff it is believed
and if this belief can only be defeated by evidence (truth-
ful or not) that is known to contradict it. An example is
the “presumption of innocence” in a trial: requiring the
members of the jury to hold the accused as “innocent until
proven guilty” means asking them to start the trial with a
“strong belief” in innocence.
Example 1 Consider a pollster (Charles) with the following
beliefs about how a voter (Alice) will vote:
  s : r c //
 
 t : c //
 
 w : d
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In the representation, the arrows represent the plausibility
relations ≥a and ≥c for Alice and Charles, but we skip the
loops and the arrows that can be obtained by transitivity.
Since Alice knows how she votes, there is no uncertainty
for her, hence no plausibility arrows (except for the loops).
There are three possible worlds s (in which Alice votes Re-
publican), w (in which she votes Democrat) and t (in which
she doesn’t vote). We assume there are no other options:
i.e. there are no other candidates and it is impossible to
vote for both candidates. The atomic sentences are r (for
“voting Republican”)and d (for “voting Democrat”). The
valuation is given in the diagram: ‖r‖ = {s}, ‖d‖ = {w}.
We assume the real world is s, so Alice will vote Republi-
can (r)! But Charles believes that she will vote Democrat
(d); and in case this turns out wrong, he’d rather believe
that she won’t vote (¬d ∧ ¬r) than accepting that she may
vote Republican: so world t is more plausible than s.
Modal Languages One can consider a number of modal
languages for the above models. See e.g. [5] for details
on a number of logics, including one that can define strong
beliefs (in terms of a “safe belief” operator). For each lan-
guage L, the semantics is given by an interpretation map,
which assigns to each sentence ϕ some doxastic proposi-
tion ‖ϕ‖. In this paper, we only consider the language of
doxastic-epistemic logic (having only operators for belief
Baϕ, knowledge Kaϕ and common knowledge Ckϕ, with
the obvious compositional semantic clauses) and its exten-
sion with conditional belief operators Bϕaψ.
G-Bisimulation For a group G ⊆ A of agents, we
say the pointed models S = (S,≥a, ‖ ‖, s0)a∈A and
S′ = (S′,≥′a, ‖ ‖′, s′0)a∈A are G-bisimilar, and write
S 'G S′, if the pointed Kripke models (S,≥a, ‖ ‖, s0)a∈G
and (S′,≥′a, ‖ ‖′, s′0)a∈G (having as accessibility relations
only the G-labeled relations) are bisimilar in the usual
sense from Modal Logic [17]. When G = A, we simply
write S ' S′, and say S and S′ are bisimilar. Bisimi-
lar models differ only formally: they encode precisely the
same doxastic-epistemic information, and they satisfy the
same modal sentences.
Types of Public Announcements: “Joint Upgrades”
We move on now to dynamics: what happens when some
proposition P is publicly announced? According to Dy-
namic Epistemic Logic, this induces a change of model:
a “model transformer”. However, the specific change de-
pends on the agents’ attitudes to the plausibility of the an-
nouncement: how certain is the new information? Three
main possibilities have been discussed in the literature: (1)
the announcement P is certainly true: it is common knowl-
edge that the speaker tells the truth; (2) the announcement
is strongly believed to be true by everybody: it is common
knowledge that everybody strongly believes that the speaker
tells the truth; (3) the announcement is (simply) believed: it
is common knowledge that everybody believes (in the sim-
ple, “weak” sense) that the speaker tells the truth. These
three alternatives correspond to three forms of “learning”
a public announcement, forms discussed in [13, 15] in a
Dynamic Epistemic Logic context: “update” 2 !P, “radi-
cal upgrade” ⇑ P and “conservative upgrade” ↑ P. Un-
der various names, they have been previously proposed in
the literature on Belief Revision, e.g. by Rott [27], and in
the literature on dynamic semantics for natural language by
Veltman [30].
We will use “joint upgrades” as a general term for all these
three model transformers, and denote them in general by
†P, where † ∈ {!,⇑, ↑}. Formally, each of our joint
upgrades is a (possibly partial) function taking as inputs
pointed models S = (S,≥a, ‖ ‖, s0) and returning new
(“upgraded”) pointed models †P(S) = (S′,≥′a, ‖ ‖′, s′0),
with S′ ⊆ S. Since upgrades are purely doxastic, they
won’t affect the real world or the “ontic facts” of each
world: i.e. they all satisfy s′0 = s0 and ‖p‖′ = ‖p‖ ∩
S′ , for atomic p. So, in order to completely describe a
given upgrade, we only have to specify (a) its possible in-
puts S, (b) the new set of states S′; (c) the new relations
≥′a.
(1) Learning Certain information: Joint “Update”. The
update !P is an operation on pointed models which is exe-
cutable (on a pointed model S) iff P is true (at S) and which
deletes all the non-P-worlds from the pointed model, leav-
ing everything else the same. Formally, an update !P is an
upgrade such that: (a) it takes as inputs only pointed models
S, such that S |= P; (b) the new set of states is S′ = PS;
(c) s ≥′a t iff s ≥a t and s, t ∈ S′.
(2) Learning from a Strongly Trusted Source: (Joint)
“Radical” Upgrade. The “radical upgrade” (or “lexico-
graphic upgrade”) ⇑ P, as an operation on pointed plau-
sibility models, can be described as “promoting” all the
P-worlds within each information cell so that they become
“better” (more plausible) than all ¬P-worlds in the same
information cell, while keeping everything else the same:
the valuation, the actual world and the relative ordering be-
tween worlds within either of the two zones (P and ¬P)
stay the same. Formally, a radical upgrade ⇑ P is (a)
a total upgrade (taking as input any model S), such that
(b) S′ = S, and (c): s ≥′a t iff either s 6∈ PS and
t ∈ s(a) ∩PS, or s ≥a t.
(3) “Barely believing” what you hear: (Joint) “Conser-
vative” Upgrade. The so-called “conservative upgrade”
↑ P (called “minimal conditional revision” by Boutilier
[19]) performs in a sense the minimal possible revision of
a model that is forced by believing the new information P.
2Note that in Belief Revision, the term “belief update” is
used for a totally different operation (the Katzuno-Mendelzon
update[25]), while what we call “update” is known as “condition-
ing”. We choose to follow here the terminology used in Dynamic
Epistemic Logic, but we want to warn the reader against any pos-
sible confusions with the KM update.
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As an operation on pointed models, it can be described as
“promoting” only the “best” (most plausible) P-worlds,
so that they become the most plausible in their information
cell, while keeping everything else the same. Formally, ↑ P
is (a) a total upgrade, such that (b) S′ = S, and (c): s ≥′a t
iff either t ∈ besta( s(a) ∩PS ) or s ≥a t.
Examples: As an example of update, consider the case in
which an absolutely infallible authority (a truth-telling “Or-
acle”) publicly announces that Alice will definitely not vote
Democrat: this is the update !(¬d), whose result is the up-
dated model
  s : r c //
 
 t :
In the same initial situation (from Example 1), consider the
case in which there is no Oracle, but instead a trusted, but
fallible source publicly announces that Alice won’t vote
Democrat. The agents have a strong trust in the veracity
of any information coming from this source, but they can-
not exclude the possibility that it might still be a lie: so this
is not an update! Instead, it is a radical upgrade ⇑ (¬d),
whose result is:
 
 w : d c //  s : r c //
 
 t :
Now, Charles believes that Alice will not vote at all; but
even if he later would learn this was not the case, he’d
still keep his newly acquired belief that Alice doesn’t vote
Democrat (so in this eventuality he’d conclude, correctly,
that she votes Republican).
Contrast this situation with the case in which the agents
“barely trust” what they hear; e.g. they just hear a rumor
that Alice will not vote Democrat. They believe the ru-
mor, but not strongly: in case they later are forced to revise
their beliefs, they’d immediately give up the belief in the
inherent veracity of the rumor. In this case, we interpret
the learning event as a conservative upgrade ↑ (¬d) of the
original model in Example 1, upgrade whose result is:
  s : r c //
 
 w : d c //
 
 t :
Now, Charles also believes Alice will not vote, but in case
he would later learn this was not the case, he’d dismiss the
rumor and revert to his older belief that Alice votes Demo-
crat.
Truthfulness A joint upgrade †P is truthful in a pointed
model S if P is true at S.
3 Iterated Upgrades
We are concerned in this paper with the problem of long-
term learning via iterated belief revision. So we need to
look at sequences (“streams”) of upgrades. We are in par-
ticular interested in learning true information, and so in it-
erating correct, or at least truthful, upgrades. In fact, our
main concern is with whether the iterated belief revision
process induced by truthful upgrades converges to a fixed
point or not.
Motivation Let us take a fresh look at the classical Muddy
Children example [22]: there are n children, and k of them
have mud on their faces; each can see the others, but not
himself. We assume that, in the beginning, the children
consider as equi-plausible all states that they cannot distin-
guish: so at the outset, for every child, being dirty is as
plausible as being clean. For three children such that only



















































where the real state is ddc (and as before we skip all the
loops in the picture). The father announces publicly: “At
least one of you is dirty”. The traditional assumption is
that the announcements provide “hard information”: it is
common knowledge that nobody lies. But now let us re-
lax this assumption, to obtain a “soft” version of the story.
We still assume that in fact nobody lies, and that it is com-
mon knowledge that everybody believes (strongly or not,
it won’t make any difference) that nobody lies: children
trust each other and they trust the father. But nevertheless
they don’t necessarily know that nobody lies. So we in-
terpret father’s announcement as either a radical upgrade
⇑ (d1 ∨ d2 ∨ d3) or a conservative one ↑ (d1 ∨ d2 ∨ d3).
















































Then the father asks, repeatedly: “Do you believe you are
dirty?” Children answer (truthfully and sincerely), and as
before they all trust each other’s answers to be true, but
they don’t know that they are true. Given this uncertainty,
we interpret their answers again as either radical upgrades
⇑ (¬B1d1 ∧ ¬B2d2 ∧ ¬B3d3) or conservative upgrades
↑ (¬B1d1 ∧¬B2d2 ∧¬B3d3) (instead of updates, as tradi-
tionally done). So no states are deleted, the uncertainty is
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Now (in the real world ddc), children 1 and 2 believe they
are dirty! In general, one can show that the classical sce-
nario still applies in this sense: after k upgrades (including
the father’s announcement and k − 1 answers), all dirty
children will believe they are dirty. If now they answer sin-
cerely once again, the process reaches a fixed point: no
matter how many times the question is asked again, the
model will stay the same from now on, since any further
answering is redundant.
Question: Is the above phenomenon general? We know
that iterated updates (on a finite model) always converge to
a fixed point (see e.g. [12] and Proposition 3 below), so the
classical Muddy Children story is a symptom of a general
phenomenon. Is the same true for the above “soft” version?
Redundancy, Informativity, Fixed Points A joint up-
grade †P is redundant on a pointed model S with respect
to a group of agents G if †P(S) 'G S. Essentially, this
means that, as far as the group G is concerned, †P doesn’t
change anything (when applied to model S): all the group
G’s mutual beliefs, conditional beliefs, strong beliefs, mu-
tual knowledge, common knowledge etc stay the same after
the upgrade. An upgrade †P is informative (on S) to group
G if it is not redundant with respect to G. An upgrade †P
is redundant with respect to (or informative to) an agent
a if it is redundant with respect to (or informative to) the
singleton group {a}. A model S is a fixed point of †P if
S ' †P(S), i.e. if †P is redundant on S with respect to the
group of all agents A.
Proposition 1 (Logical Characterizations of Redundancy
and Fixed Points)
1. !P is redundant with respect to a groupG iff P is com-
mon knowledge in the group G; i.e. S 'G!P(S) iff
S |= CkGP. Special case: !P is redundant with re-
spect to an agent a iff a knows P. Another special
case: S is a fixed point of !P iff S |= CkP.
2. ⇑ P is redundant with respect to a group G iff it is
common knowledge in the group G that P is strongly
believed (by all G-agents); i.e. S 'G⇑ P(S) iff
S |= CkG(ESbGP). Special case: ⇑ P is redun-
dant with respect to an agent a iff a strongly believes
P. Another special case: S is a fixed point of ⇑ P iff
S |= Ck(ESbP).
3. ↑ P is redundant with respect to a group G iff it
is common knowledge in the group G that P is be-
lieved (by all G-agents); i.e. S 'G↑ P(S) iff S |=
CkG(EbGP). Special case: ↑ P is redundant with
respect to an agent a iff a believes P. Another special
case: S is a fixed point of ↑ P iff S |= Ck(EbP).
Redundancy and informativity are especially important if
we want to capture the “sincerity” of an announcement
made by a speaker. Intuitively, an announcement is sincere
when it doesn’t go against the speaker’s prior epistemic
state: accepting the announcement should not change the
speaker’s own state. So an announcement †P (made by an
agent a) is said to be “sincere” for (the speaker) a on a
pointed model S iff the upgrade †P is redundant with re-
spect to a. In particular, an update !P is sincere for a iff a
(already) knows P; a radical upgrade ⇑ P is sincere for a
iff a (already) strongly believes P; and ↑ P is sincere for a
iff a (already) believes P.
Upgrade Streams An upgrade stream †~P = (†Pn)n∈N is
an infinite sequence of joint upgrades †Pn of the same type
† ∈ {!,⇑, ↑}. An upgrade stream is definable in a logic L
if all Pn are of the form Pn = ‖ϕn‖ for some ϕn ∈ L.
Any upgrade stream †~P induces a function mapping ev-
ery pointed model S into an infinite sequence †~P(S) =
(Sn)n∈N of pointed models, defined inductively by:
S0 = S, and Sn+1 = †Pn(Sn).
The upgrade stream †~P is truthful if every †Pn is truthful
with respect to Sn (i.e. Sn |= Pn). The stream †~P is
sincere if all its upgrades are sincere for at least one agent at
the moment of speaking: i.e. for every n there exists an ∈
A such that †Pn is sincere for an on Sn. Sincere upgrade
streams model (sincere) communication processes within a
group, while truthful streams model learning processes (by
the group).
A repeated truthful upgrade is a truthful upgrade stream
of the form (†Pn)n∈N , where Pn ∈ {P,¬P} for some
proposition P. In other words, it consists in repeatedly
learning the answer to the “same” question P? (such as the
Father’s repeated question in the Muddy Children story).
We say that a stream †~P stabilizes a (pointed) model S if
there exists some n ∈ N such that Sn ' Sm for allm > n.
Obviously, a repeated upgrade stabilizes S if it reaches a
fixed point of †P or of †(¬P).
We say that †~P stabilizes all (simple, non-conditional) be-
liefs on the model S if the process of belief-changing in-
duced by †~P on S reaches a fixed point; i.e. if there ex-
ists some n ∈ N such that Sn |= BaP iff Sm |= BaP,
for all a ∈ A, all m > n and all doxastic propositions
45
P. Equivalently, iff there exists some n ∈ N such that
(bestas0(a))Sn = (bestas0(a))Sm for all a ∈ A and all
m > n.
Similarly, we say that †~P stabilizes all conditional be-
liefs on the model S if the process of conditional-belief-
changing induced by †~P on S reaches a fixed point; i.e. if
there exists n ∈ N such that Sn |= BRa P iff Sm |= BRa P,
for all a ∈ A, all m > n and all doxastic propositions
P,R. Equivalently, iff there exists n ∈ N such that
(bestas0(a)∩R)Sn = (bestas0(a)∩R)Sm for all a ∈ A,
all m > n and all R.
A similar definition can be formulated for stabilization of
strong beliefs. Finally, †~P stabilizes all knowledge on the
model S if the knowledge-changing process induced by †~P
on S reaches a fixed point; i.e. if there exists n ∈ N such
that Sn |= KaP iff Sm |= KaP for all a ∈ A, all m > n
and all propositions P. Equivalently, iff there exists n ∈ N
such that (s0(a))Sn = (s0(a))Sm for all a ∈ A and all
m > n.
Lemma 2 The following are equivalent:
• An upgrade stream †~P stabilizes a pointed model S.
• †~P stabilizes all conditional beliefs on S.
Also, the above conditions imply that †~P stabilizes all
knowledge, all (simple) beliefs and all strong beliefs.
The following result is just an adapted version of a result in
[12]:
Proposition 3 Every update stream stabilizes every model
on which it is executable3.
Corollary 4 Every upgrade stream stabilizes all knowledge.
The analogue of Proposition 3 is not true for arbitrary up-
grade streams, not even for truthful upgrade streams. In-
deed, it is not even true for repeated truthful upgrades:
Counterexample: In the situation from Example 1, sup-
pose that the strongly trusted (but fallible) source publicly
announces the following true statement P: “If Charles
would truthfully learn that Alice won’t vote Republican,
then his resulting belief about whether or not she votes
Democrat would be wrong”. P can be rendered as
¬r ⇒ (B¬rd ⇔ ¬d).
This is a truthful radical upgrade ⇑ P (since the proposition
P is true in the actual world s, as well as in t), and yields
the model
 
 w : d c //  s : r c //
 
 t :
3An update stream (!Pn)n∈N is executable on S if each !Pn
is executable at its turn, i.e. if Sn |= Pn for all n.
The same sentence is again true in (the real world) s and in
w, so ⇑ P is again truthful, resulting in:
 
 t : c //
 
 w : d c //  s : r
Another truthful upgrade with the same proposition pro-
duces 
 w : d c //
 
 t : c //  s : r
then another truthful upgrade ⇑ P gets us back to the pre-
vious model: 
 t : c //
 
 w : d c //  s : r
Clearly from now on the last two models will keep reap-
pearing, in an endless cycle: hence in this example, con-
ditional beliefs never stabilize! The same applies to strong
beliefs. But note that the simple beliefs are the same in
these last two models, since s is the most plausible world
in both: so the set of simple (non-conditional) beliefs stays
the same from now on. This is not an accident, but a symp-
tom of a more general converge phenomenon:
Theorem 5 Every truthful radical upgrade stream
(⇑ Pn)n∈N stabilizes all (simple, non-conditional) beliefs
(even if it doesn’t stabilize the model).
This is the main theorem of this paper, and it has a num-
ber of important consequences. Its proof (included in the
Appendix) is non-trivial, and needs a number of other pre-
liminary Lemmas.
Corollary 6 Every repeated truthful radical upgrade de-
finable in doxastic-epistemic logic (i.e. in the language of
simple belief and knowledge operators, without any condi-
tional beliefs) stabilizes every model (with respect to which
it is correct), and thus stabilizes all conditional beliefs.
Nevertheless, the (analogues of the) last two results are not
true for conservative upgrades:
Counterexample: Suppose that, in the situation described
in Example 1, the agents hears a rumor Q saying that:
“Either Alice will vote Republican or else Charles’ beliefs
about whether or not she votes Democrat are wrong”.
r ∨ (d ∧ ¬Bd) ∨ (¬d ∧Bd)
This is a truthful conservative upgrade ↑ Q, since Q is true
in s (as well as in t). Its result is:
  s : r c //
 
 w : d c //
 
 t :
Again, the sentence Q is true in the actual state s (as well
as in w), so ↑ Q can again applied, producing:
  s : r c //
 
 t : c //
 
 w : d
So these two models (supporting opposite beliefs!) will
keep reappearing, in an endless cycle.
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4 Conclusions
This paper is just a first investigation of the long-term be-
havior of doxastic structures under iterated revision with
higher-level doxastic information. In the context of very
simple forms of new information, this type of problem has
been studied in Learning Theory. In the context of updat-
ing only with purely propositional information, the prob-
lem has been tackled in the Belief Revision literature. But
as far as we are aware, there are essentially no results on
convergence of iterated revision with higher-level doxastic
information in the literature to date. So our investigation
here is a first step in tackling this question.
As is natural in science when a new problem is first consid-
ered, we start with the simplest possible setting, by consid-
ering here only (the belief revision induced by) the sim-
plest type of communication: truthful public announce-
ments (though with various degrees of inherent plausibil-
ity). The simplicity of this type of information update (its
“primitive and 1980’s-like” nature, to use the unnecessar-
ily abusive label affixed to our paper by one unsympathetic
TARK referee) is not due to a lack of knowledge or ap-
preciation for wider settings allowing for richer and more
sophisticated types of information update. Nor it is due to
a limitation of current logical formalisms: against the im-
pression of some economists such as the mentioned referee
(impression explainable only by ignorance of the logical
literature), the state of the art in Economics with respect to
modeling communication does not seem to be “above and
beyond” the current state in Logic. In particular, in the Dy-
namic Epistemic Logic tradition there exist sophisticated
models for a wide range of types of communication, start-
ing with the work in [3, 2] on “epistemic actions” that can
be partially opaque or misleading to at least some of the
participants, continuing with the work in [26, 16] on prob-
abilistic epistemic updates and the work in [1, 20, 21] on
multi-agent belief revision, and including our own recent
contributions [5, 7, 6, 8, 10, 9] on the belief revision in-
duced by various forms of deceiving communication, e.g.
lying, misreporting, impersonation, secrecy, secret inter-
ception of messages (wiretapping) etc.
But aiming for maximum generality is not the point of
this paper. On the contrary, if one restates our results
for the most general class of communication updates, then
they become trivial: it is straightforward to generate in-
finite belief-revision cycles with no fixed points if one al-
lows for cheating, lying and misreporting! Indeed, if the
truthfulness requirement is given up, then an easy example
is the infinite sequence of purely propositional upgrades
⇑ p,⇑ ¬p,⇑ p,⇑ ¬p, . . .. But the main point of our pa-
per is precisely to investigate the iterated belief revision
induced by “ideal”, non-deceiving, public communication
by a commonly trusted (though not infallible) agent. We
show that even in such ideal circumstances, iterated up-
dates with higher-level information pose new challenges
and lead to a highly non-trivial long-term dynamics. So
our “naive” simplifying assumptions about communication
do not make our results weaker, or less widely applicable,
or of more limited value. On the contrary, these results are
stronger and more general than their analogues for wider
classes of information updates; they show that infinite cy-
cles and divergence of belief revision cannot be avoided
even in the most ideal case, but that they are a necessary
product of iterated revision with higher-level doxastic in-
formation from a potentially fallible (even if highly trusted,
and even if in fact always truthful) source.
To summarize our results, we provide answers to the Ques-
tion in Section 3, regarding how typical is the “soft” ver-
sion of the Muddy Children Story, as far as convergence is
concerned. The answer depends on the children’s degree of
trust in the announcements. If we consider them as radical
upgrades, the Muddy Children outcome is symptomatic for
a general phenomenon: repeated truthful radical upgrades
with a (same) proposition definable in doxastic-epistemic
logic lead to a fixed point. However, this phenomenon is
not as general as it might be: unlike the case of repeated up-
dates, repeated radical upgrades with truthful information
do not in general lead to a true fixed point (although they
stabilize the simple beliefs). Moreover, if we consider the
announcements as conservative upgrades, then the Muddy
Children outcome is atypical: repeated conservative up-
grades (even with truthful sentences in doxastic-epistemic
logic) do not in general reach a fixed point (nor do they
stabilize the simple beliefs).
The contributions in this paper are not tied to the specific
way we model knowledge, belief, updates etc. First of all,
as explained in Section 2, our plausibility-model setting is
nothing but the most natural and obvious multi-agent gen-
eralization of structures that are standard in Belief Revi-
sion Theory. In their turn, these structures are simply the
qualitative core of structures (such as conditional lexico-
graphic probability spaces) that are commonly used in the
Economics literature to deal with belief revision. Our qual-
itative version is simpler and more general, as it subsumes
conditional lexicographic probability spaces, as well as
conditional probability spaces in the style of Popper, Renyi
and de Finetti, but in the same time it is rich and expres-
sive enough to define all the relevant qualitative notions. In
particular, our notions of “belief”, “conditional belief” and
“strong belief” are essentially the same as the ones of Bat-
tigalli and Siniscalchi [11]. Second, the type of informa-
tion upgrades we consider in this paper are the simplest and
most natural qualitative analogues of the conditionalization
rules that are most commonly used in probabilistic settings
for belief update, and in their applications to Economics:
in particular, our “update” !P is the qualitative (multi-agent
and public) analogue of Bayesian conditionalization, while
our “radical upgrade” is the qualitative (multi-agent and
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public) analogue of Jeffrey conditionalization (or, more
precisely, its special case of conditionalizing only with in-
formation given by a binary partition4). Thirdly, results
analogue to ours can in fact be proved directly for con-
ditional lexicographic probability spaces and other prob-
abilistic belief-revision structures used in Game Theory, if
one considers iterated revision by Jeffrey conditionaliza-
tion with higher-level information (about the agents’ con-
ditional probabilities). As far as we know, these results are
also new, and they form the topic of another forthcoming
paper. The reasons we choose to stick here with a qual-
itative setting are logical simplicity, generality and trans-
parency. Our setting makes obvious the fact that our results
do not depend on the specific quantitative-probabilistic de-
tails of modeling belief and belief-revision, but they are
general, robust, qualitative results telling us something im-
portant about the long-term belief dynamics under revision
with higher-level information.
A non-logician (and in particular an economist or a philoso-
pher of language) in the TARK audience of our talk may
feel justified to follow one of our referees in asking himself
or herself the question “What have I learned that I didn’t
really already know, at the conceptual level?”. Our answer
is that this paper reveals the surprisingly non-trivial long-
term belief dynamics induced even by very simple, “ideal”
forms of learning, such as truthful public communication
by a non-deceiving, commonly trusted agent. We show that,
even in our simple, general qualitative setting, the conver-
gence or the cyclic behavior of doxastic attitudes under it-
erated learning are highly dependent on subtle details, such
as the specific doxastic attitude whose convergence is in-
vestigated (belief, strong belief, knowledge or conditional
belief), the listener’s degree of trust in the speaker (e.g. her
strong belief in the speaker’s veracity versus her simple be-
lief in it), the type of new information that is received and
the language in which it is expressible (e.g. simple propo-
sitional information, higher-level doxastic information ex-
pressible only in terms of simple belief and knowledge,
or even more complex information that can refer to con-
ditional beliefs). And we show that, despite this complex-
ity, certain doxastic attitudes (simple belief, knowledge) do
converge in general enough conditions.5
Acknowledgments
The authors give special thanks to J. van Benthem for pro-
viding the seminal ideas and challenges that gave rise to
this paper. We thank D. Mackinson for his insightful com-
mentary on the second’s author’s LSE presentation of pre-
liminary work leading to this paper. We thank to the anony-
4We consider a more general qualitative analogue of Jeffrey’s
rule in our forthcoming paper [4], where we also prove in that
general setting results analogue to the ones in this paper.
5Indeed, our convergence results are generalized to arbitrary
Jeffrey-type “upgrades” in our forthcoming paper [4].
mous TARK referees for their comments. The research of
the first author was partially supported by the Netherlands
Organization for Scientific Research, grant number B 62-
635, which is herewith gratefully acknowledged. The sec-
ond author acknowledges the support by the University of
Groningen via a Rosalind Franklin research position.
References
[1] G. Aucher. A combined system for update logic and
belief revision. Master’s thesis, ILLC, University of
Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2003.
[2] A. Baltag and L.S. Moss. Logics for epistemic pro-
grams. Synthese, 139:165–224, 2004. Knowledge,
Rationality & Action 1–60.
[3] A. Baltag, L.S. Moss, and S. Solecki. The logic of
common knowledge, public announcements, and pri-
vate suspicions. In I. Gilboa, editor, Proc. of TARK
98, pages 43–56, 1998.
[4] A. Baltag and S. Smets. Learning by questions and
answers: from belief-revision cycles to doxastic fixed
points. In Proc. of WOLLIC’09. Manuscript, to ap-
pear, 2009.
[5] A. Baltag and S. Smets. Conditional doxastic mod-
els: a qualitative approach to dynamic belief revi-
sion. Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Sci-
ence, 165:5–21, 2006.
[6] A. Baltag and S. Smets. Dynamic belief revision
over multi-agent plausibility models. In W. van der
Hoek and M. Wooldridge, editors, Proceedings of
LOFT’06, pages 11–24. University of Liverpool, Liv-
erpool, 2006.
[7] A. Baltag and S. Smets. The logic of conditional dox-
astic actions: a theory of dynamic multi-agent belief
revision. In Proceedings of ESSLLI Workshop on Ra-
tionality and Knowledge. 2006.
[8] A. Baltag and S. Smets. Probabilistic dynamic belief
revision. In J. van Benthem, S. Ju, and F. Veltman, ed-
itors, Proceedings of LORI’07, pages 21–39. College
Publications, London, 2007.
[9] A. Baltag and S. Smets. The logic of conditional dox-
astic actions. In K. Apt and R. van Rooij, editors,
Texts in Logic and Games, volume 4, pages 9–32.
Amsterdam University Press, 2008.
[10] A. Baltag and S. Smets. A qualitative theory of dy-
namic interactive belief revision. In G. Bonanno,
W. van der Hoek, and M. Wooldridge, editors, Texts in
Logic and Games, volume 3, pages 9–58. Amsterdam
University Press, 2008.
48
[11] P. Battigalli and M. Siniscalchi. Strong belief and
forward induction reasoning. Journal of Econonomic
Theory, 105:356–391, 2002.
[12] J.F.A.K. van Benthem. One is a lonely number.
In P. Koepke Z. Chatzidakis and W. Pohlers, edi-
tors, Logic Colloquium 2002, pages 96–129. ASL and
A.K. Peters, Wellesley MA, 2006.
[13] J.F.A.K. van Benthem. Dynamic logic of belief re-
vision. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 17
(2):129–155, 2007.
[14] J.F.A.K. van Benthem. Rational dynamics. Interna-
tional Game Theory Review, 9 (1):13–45, 2007.
[15] J.F.A.K. van Benthem. Logical dynamics of informa-
tion and interaction. In Manuscript. 2009. To appear.
[16] J.F.A.K. van Benthem, J. van Eijck, and B.P. Kooi.
Logics of communication and change. Information
and Computation, 204(11):1620–1662, 2006.
[17] P. Blackburn, M. de Rijke, and Y. Venema. Modal
Logic. Number 53 in Cambridge Tracts in Theoret-
ical Computer Science. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2001.
[18] O. Board. Dynamic interactive epistemology. Games
and Economic Behaviour, 49:49–80, 2002.
[19] C. Boutilier. Iterated revision and minimal change of
conditional beliefs. Journal of Philosophical Logic,
25(3):262–305, 1996.
[20] H.P. van Ditmarsch. Prolegomena to dynamic logic
for belief revision. Synthese, 147:229–275, 2005.
[21] H.P. van Ditmarsch and W. Labuschagne. My beliefs
about your beliefs: a case study in theory of mind and
epistemic logic. Synthese, 155:191–209, 2007.
[22] R. Fagin, J.Y. Halpern, Y. Moses, and M.Y. Vardi.
Reasoning about Knowledge. MIT Press, Cambridge
MA, 1995.
[23] A. Grove. Two modellings for theory change. Journal
of Philosophical Logic, 17:157–170, 1988.
[24] J.Y. Halpern. Reasoning about Uncertainty. MIT
Press, Cambridge MA, 2003.
[25] H. Katsuno and A. Mendelzon. On the difference be-
tween updating a knowledge base and revising it. In
Cambridge Tracts in Theoretical Computer Science,
pages 183–203, 1992.
[26] B.P. Kooi. Probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic.
Journal of Logic, Language and Information,
12:381–408, 2003.
[27] H. Rott. Conditionals and theory change: revisions,
expansions, and additions. Synthese, 81:91–113,
1989.
[28] W. Spohn. Ordinal conditional functions: a dy-
namic theory of epistemic states. In W.L. Harper
and B. Skyrms, editors, Causation in Decision, Be-
lief Change, and Statistics, volume II, pages 105–134,
1988.
[29] R. Stalnaker. Knowledge, belief and counterfactual
reasoning in games. Economics and Philosophy,
12:133–163, 1996.
[30] F. Veltman. Defaults in update semantics. Journal of
Philosophical Logic, 25:221–261, 1996.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2: (1) ⇒ (2) is obvious: if the model
stabilizes, then so do the conditional beliefs.
For (2) ⇒ (1): suppose all conditional beliefs stabilized
at stage n. Then, for s, t ∈ S, we have the sequence
of equivalencies: s <a t in Sn iff Sn |= B{s,t}a ¬{t} iff
Sm |= B{s,t}a ¬{t} iff s <a t in Sm. (Here, to be pedantic,
we should actually replace {s}, {t}, {s, t} by any doxastic
propositions P,Q,R such that PS = {s}, QS = {t} and
RS = {s, t}.)
The rest of the claims follow from the fact that knowl-
edge, simple belief and strong belief can be com-
pletely characterized in terms of conditional beliefs:
KaP = B¬Pa P; BaP = B
>
a P; and (by the
Characterization given in the paper) S |= SbaP
iff: S |= BaP and S |= BQa P for every Q such that S |=
¬Ka(Q → ¬P).
Proof of Proposition 3: An update changes only the set of
possible states, leaving the same order, same valuation etc.
on the remaining states. But the sequence (Sn)n∈N of sets
of states of the models generated by any executable update
is an infinite descending chain S0 ⊇ S1 ⊇ · · ·Sn ⊇ · · · of
finite sets, and thus it must stabilize: there exists some stage
n such that Sn = Sm for all m > n. Since everything else
stays the same, the model itself stabilizes at that stage.
Proof of Corollary 4: For update streams, this follows
from Proposition 3. The other types of upgrades never
eliminate any states and never change the information par-
titions, so knowledge stays the same.
For the Proof of Theorem 5, we assume the following
setting: let (⇑ Pn)n∈N be a radical upgrade stream, let
S = (S,≤a, ‖ · ‖, s0) be a pointed model, and let (Sn)n∈N
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be the sequence of pointed models Sn = (Sn,≤na , ‖ · ‖, s0)
defined by applying in turn each of the upgrades:
S0 = S, and Sn+1 =⇑ Pn(Sn).
In the following we assume that (⇑ Pn)n∈N is truthful with
respect to S, i.e. Sn |= Pn for all n ∈ N .
For P ⊆ S, we denote by bestnaP := Min≤naP .
In order to prove Theorem 5, we need a number of prelim-
inary lemmas.
Lemma 7 For all n ∈ N , all s ∈ s0(a) ∩
⋂
i<n(Pi)Si and




, we have: s <na t.
Proof. This is by induction on n: for n = 0, it is trivially
true (since
⋂
i<0(Pi)Si = ∅). For the induction step: we
assume it true for n. After applying ⇑ Pn to Sn, we have
(by the definition of an upgrade) that: s <n+1a w for all s ∈
s0(a)∩ (Pn)Sn and all w ∈ s0(a) \ (Pn)Sn (since all Pn-
worlds get “promoted”); and also that











(because of the induction assumption and of the fact that in-
side the s0(a)∩(Pn)Sn -zone the old order≤na is preserved
by applying ⇑ Pn). Putting these together, and using the
transitivity of <n+1a , we get the desired conclusion:
















Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that, for some
n, there is some state t ∈ bestna(s0(a)) such that
t 6∈
⋂
i<n(Pi)Si . Then t ∈ s0(a) \ (
⋂
i<n(Pi)Si ).
By the “truthfulness” assumption, the real world s0 has
the property that s0 ∈ (Pi)Si for all i, and hence
s0 ∈ s0(a) ∩ (
⋂
i<n(Pi)Si ). By Lemma 7, s0 <
n
a t,
which contradicts the assumption that t ∈ bestna(s0(a)).






Proof. This follows immediately from the previous
Lemma, together with the definition of bestna and our as-
sumption that ≥a is locally connected (so that it is in fact
connected on the cell s0(a)).







(Pi)Si , for all m ≥ n0 .
Proof. This is because the sequence
s0(a) ⊇ s0(a) ∩ (P0)S0 ⊇ · · · s0(a) ∩
⋂
i<n(Pi)Si ⊇ · · ·
is an infinite descending sequence of finite sets, so it must
stabilize at some stage n0.
Now we can finish the proof of our main result.
Proof of Theorem 5: By the definition of radical upgrades,
we know that, for every m, the order inside the s0(a) ∩
(Pm)Sm zone is left the same by ⇑ Pm.




(Pi)Si ⊆ so(a) ∩ (Pm)Sm for all m ≥ n0.
Hence, the order inside s0(a) ∩
⋂
i<n0
(Pi)Si is left the
same by all future upgrades ⇑ Pm, with m ≥ n0. As a















This, together with the previous two Lemmas, gives us


















= bestma (s0(a)), for all m ≥ n0. So the sequence of most
plausible states in s0(a) stabilizes at n0.
Proof of Corollary 6: Suppose we have a repeated truth-
ful radical upgrade ⇑ P, . . ., such that P = ‖ϕ‖ is de-
finable by a sentence ϕ in doxastic-epistemic logic. By
Corollary 4 and Theorem 5, we know that there is some n0
such that (s0(a))Sn0 = (s0(a))Sm and best
n0
a (s0(a)) =
bestma (s0(a)), for all m ≥ n0. We also know that the
valuation is stable. Using these (and the full introspection
of knowledge and beliefs), we can check (by induction on
ψ) that, for every doxastic-epistemic sentence ψ, we have
‖ψ‖Sn0 = ‖ψ‖Sm for all m ≥ n0. So, in particular, the
interpretation of the sentence ϕ stabilizes at stage n0, and
hence the set PSn stabilizes at stage n = n0, and so does
the set (¬P)Sn = S \PSn (and so in particular only one of
P or ¬P is true at Sm for all m ≥ n0, so only one of the
upgrades ⇑ P or ⇑ (¬P) is truthful for allm ≥ n0). Hence
(by the definition of the model transformations induced by
⇑ P and by ⇑ (¬P)), applying (whichever of the two is)
the truthful upgrade ⇑ P (or ⇑ (¬P)) will not produce any
more changes after this stage.
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